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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

The trial court erred by not granting the motion to dismiss

for lack of a speedy trial.

The issue is a question of law and the

Standard of Review is a "correction of error11 standard.

[See

State v. Johnson, 771 P 2d 326 (Utah App. 1989).]
2.

The trial court erred by not granting the motion to dismiss

for denial of equal protection and due process.

The issue is a ques-

tion of law and the Standard of Review is a "correction of error"
standard.
3.

(See State v. Johnson, supra.)

Where a traffic offense occurs partly in a jurisdiction

that has a justice court and it is a Class C Misdemeanor, a Circuit
Court has no jurisdiction.

The Standard of Review is "de novo" where

the question is whether the trial court had jurisdiction as a matter
of law.
4.

[See Barlow v. Cappo, 821 P 2d 465, (Utah App. 1991).]
The trial court erred by not requiring the clerk to draw

the jury panel by lot instead of seating the panel in alphabetical
order.

The Standard of Review is a "correction of error" standard.

(See State v. Johnson, supra.)
5.

Where the prospective jurors were not willing to give the

defendant the presumption of innocence if he chose not to testify
the entire panel should have been discharged.
Review is a "correction of error" standard.

The Standard of
(See State v. Johnson,

supra.)
6.

The trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial when
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viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict is sufficient
to support the jury verdict.

[See State v. Singer, 815 P 2d 1303

(Utah App. 1991).
11.

The trial court erred by not sua sponte requiring another

bailiff to attend the proceedings on April 3, 1992 and April 24,
1992 where the information showed the bailiff was the only witness
for the state in this case.
discretion determination.
12.

The Standard of Review is an abuse of
(See Logan City v. Carlsen, supra.)

The trial court erred by not ruling upon the state's

motion to amend the information made on April 3, 1992 to change the
date of the offense to May 16, 1991 as with the motion pending the
defendant could not present evidence of an alibi nor could the
defendant exercise his right to testify in his own behalf without
knowing with certainty the date of the alleged offense.
of Review is a "correction of error11 standard.

The Standard

(See State v. Johnson,

supra.)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Issue No. 1:
a.

Amendment VI of the United States Constitution reads as

follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
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b.

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution reads as

follows:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself;
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband,
nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
c.

Section 77-1-6 (l)(f) Utah Code Ann. 1953, reads as follows:

In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled . . To a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
d.

Rule 25(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads

as follows:
The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when:
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defendant to trial.
Issue No. 2:
a.

Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution reads in

part as follows:
. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
b.

Article I, Sections 7 and 24 of the Utah Constitution read

as follows:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.

-5-

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
c.

Section 41-6-167 Utah Code Ann. 1953 reads as follows:

(a) Upon any violation of this act punishable as a misdemeanor,
whenever a person is (not) immediately taken before a magistrate
as hereinbefore provided, the police officer shall prepare in
triplicate or more copies a written notice to appear in court
containing the name and address of such person, the number,
if any, of his operator's license, the registration number of
his vehicle, the offense charged, and the time and place when
and where such person shall appear in court.
(b) The time specified in said notice to appear must be at least
five days after such arrest unless the person arrested shall demand an earlier hearing.
(c) The place specified in said notice to appear must be made
before a magistrate within the county in which the offense
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction
of such offense.
(d) The arrested person, in order to secure release as provided
in this section, must give his written promise satisfactory to
the arresting officer so to appear in court by signing at least
one copy of the written notice prepared by the arresting officer.
The officer shall deliver a copy of such notice to the person
promising to appear. Thereupon, said officer shall forthwith
release the person arrested from custody.
(e) Any officer violating any of the provisions of this section
shall be guilty of misconduct in office and shall be subject
to removal from office.
d.

Section 41-6-169 Utah Code Ann. 1953 reads as follows:

The foregoing provisions of this act shall govern all police
officers in making arrests without warrant for violations of
this act, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not otherwise be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for
the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of like
grade.
e.

Rule 6(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads in part

as follows:
. . Upon the filing of an information, if it appears from the
information, or from any affidavit filed with the information,

-6-

that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the accused has commited it, the
magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest
or a summons for the appearance of the accused.
Issue No. 3:
a.

Sections 77-7-19(4)(a) and (b), 77-25-1, 78-4-5 and 78-

5-104, Utah Code Ann. 1953, read as follows:
77-7-19(4)(a) Except where otherwise provided by law, a
citation or information issued for violations of Title 41
shall state that the person receiving the citation or
information shall appear before the magistrate who has
jurisdiction over the offense charged.
(b) If the citation or information is issued for an offense
under the jurisdiction of the justice courts and occurs within
the geographical boundaries of any municipality or county
precinct where a justice court exists and a justice court judge
is currently serving, that court is the magistrate before
whom the person shall appear.
77-25-1 The jurisdiction of justice courts, except as otherwise provided by law, shall extend to the limits of the county
in which the justice court is located.
78-4-5 Circuit courts have jurisdiction over Class A Misdemeanors.
Circuit courts have jurisdiction over class B misdemeanors
classified by Title 41, Chapter 6, Article 5, Driving While Intoxicated and Reckless Driving, ordinances that comply with
the requirements of Section 41-6-43, and class B misdemeanors
classified by any title other than Title 41. Circuit courts
have jurisdiction over all related misdemeanors arising out
of a single criminal episode. When a justice court is given
jurisdiction of a criminal matter and there is no justice
court with territorial jurisdiction, the circuit court shall
have jurisdiction. The circuit court shall retain jurisdiction
over cases properly filed in the circuit court prior to January
1, 1992. The circuit court shall have jurisdiction as provided
in Section 10-3-923.
[78-4-5 in effect on June 3, 1991 provides in part as follows:
(l)(c) All complaints for offenses charged under Title 41
except offenses charged under Article 5, Chapter 6, Title 41,
shall be filed in the municipal justice court or the county
justice court where the offense occurred if those justice courts
exist and have jurisdiction of the offenses.

-7-

78-5-104 (1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B
and C misdemeanors, violations of ordinances, and infractions
committed within their territorial jurisdiciton, except those
offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction.
[On June 3,1991 78-5-104 provided in part as follows: (2)(a)
Municipal justice courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
over the following offense committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court: (i) all city or town ordinances; and
(ii) offenses charged under Title 41 except driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a blood alcohol
content of .08% or higher, and reckless driving.
b.

Rule 7(2) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as

follows:
When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with
or without a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to a
magistrate under Section 77-7-19. If a magistrate is not
available in the circuit or precinct, the person arrested shall
be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of
bail. If an information has not been filed, one shall be
filed without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction
over the offense.
c.
provide

Rule 5(e) and 81 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
as follows:

(5)(e) The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court
as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the
papers to be filed with him, in which event he shall note thereon
the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the
clerk, if any.
(81)(e) These rules of procedure shall also govern in any
aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied
does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement .
Issue No. 4:
a.

Rule 18(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides

as follows:
The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of jurors
that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as
-8-

will allow for all peremptory challenges permitted. . .
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall
make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning
with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court
may direct, until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or
waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so
many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, in
the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose
names are so called shall constitute the jury.
Issue No. 5:
a.

Rule 18(e)(14) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides as follows:
(the challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror
and may be taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror
with reference to the cause, or to either party, which will
prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice
to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no
person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements
in public journals or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily
appears to the court that the juror can and will, notwithstanding such opinion act impartially and fairly upon the matter to
be submitted to him.
Issue No. 6:
a.

Rule 611 (a) Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows:

The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence
so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective
for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.
Issue Nos. 7 and 8:
a.

Sections 41-2-102(25), 41-2-104, 41-2-136,

41-12a-412

read as follows:
41-2-102(25) [In effect in May 1991 (now appears as subsection
27)] "Suspension" means the temporary withdrawal by action of
the division of a licensee's privilege to operate a motor vehicle.
-9-

41-2-10i(l) No person except one expressly exempted under
Section 41-2-107, 41-2-108, or 41-2-111, or Subsection 41-2121(4), or Chapter 22, Title 41, may operate a motor vehicle
on a highway in this state unless the person is licensed as
an operator by the division under this chapter.
41-2-136(1) and (2) A person whose license has been denied,
suspended, disqualified, or revoked under this chapter and
operates any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state
while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked shall be punished as provided in this section.
A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other than
a violation specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a Class
C Misdemeanor.
41-12a-412(l) No motor vehicle may be registered in the name of
any person required to file proof of owner's security unless
proof of that security is furnished for the motor vehicle.
(2) Whenever the department lawfully suspends or revokes the
driverfs license of any person upon receiving record of a
conviction or a forfeiture of bail, the department shall
also suspend the registration for all motor vehicles registered
in the name of the person. However, the department may not
suspend the person1s motor vehicle registration, unless otherwise required by law, if the person has given or immediately
gives and then maintains proof of owner's security for all motor
vehicles registered by the person.
(3) Licenses and registrations suspended or revoked under
this section may not be renewed, nor may any driver's
license thereafter be issued, nor may any motor vehicle be
thereafter registered in the name of the person until he
gives and thereafter maintains proof of owner's security.
(4) If a person is not licensed, but by final order or judgment
is convicted or forfeits any bail or collateral deposited to
secure an appearance for trial for any offense requiring
suspension or revocation of license, or for operating an
unregistered motor vehicle upon the highways, no license may
may thereafter be issued to the person and no motor vehicle may
continue to be registered in his name until he gives and
thereafter maintains proof of owner's security.
(5) Whenever the department suspends or revokes a nonresident's
operating privilege by reason of a conviction or forfeiture of
bail, this privilege remains suspended or revoked unless the
person has given or immediately gives and thereafter maintains
proof of owner's security.
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Issue No. 9:
a.

Rule 18(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors
that are to try the case plus such an additional number as will
allow for all preemptory challenges permitted. After each
challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to
fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges
for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the
jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution,
shall indicate thereon its preemptory challenge to one juror
at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until all
preemptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall
then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they
appear on the list, and the persons whose names are so called
shall constitute the jury.
Issue No. 10:
a.

Section 76-2-101 Utah Code Ann. 1953 reads as follows:

No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited
by law and:
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with
criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified
in the statute defining the offense, as the definition of the
offense requires; or
(2) His acts constitute an
liability.

offense involving strict

These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to
the violations set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law.
b.

Section 76-2-102 Utah Code Ann. 1953 reads as follows:

Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a
culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does
not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense
shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal
responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An Information was filed on June 6, 1991 charging the defendant
with Driving on Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor, and summons was
served on the defendant on June 3, 1991 just prior to his entrance
in Court on another case.

(R. 183-5) (T-3 6-7) [Reference to April

3, 1992 transcript will be T-3, April 24, 1992 T-24, and May 8, 1992
T-8.]

On January 31 1992 defendant was arraigned and an attorney was

appointed on February 4, 1992 (R 171, 175), and after some preliminary
motions the defendant was tried by a jury on May 8, 1992 and found
guilty and was sentenced to 30 days in jail to be suspended upon payment of a fine of $150.00. (R 21)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 3, 1991 James Meacham,

the bailiff in Judge Roger S.

Dutsonfs court in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District,
State of Utah, in and for the County of Cache (T-3 5-6), went before
the Honorable Clint Judkins, another judge in the First Circuit, and
swore to an information charging the defendant with the crime of
Driving on Suspension, a Class C Misdemeanor (R 186), alleged to have
occurred on May 17, 1991 in Cache County, Utah.

Just prior to a

hearing on another matter in First Circuit Court set for 4 p.m. on
June 3, 1991 in Judge Dutson1s court room the defendant was served with
a summons requiring him to appear on the first Tuesday after service
which would be the next day, June 4, 1991 (R 183-185).

It is

not clear who served the summons as the summons shows it was served
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by D. R. Meacham (R. 185), another deputy Cache County Sheriff,
but James Meacham testified that he served the summons (T-3 6, T-8
68).
No citation had ever been given to the defendant and officer
Meacham testified when he claimed to have seen the defendant driving
he did not stop him (T-8 64). Officer Meacham also testified
that on or about the same time he claimed to have seen another
person whom he thought was driving on suspension and he did not
stop him either and give him a citation, but he did place him under
arrest about ten minutes after he claims to have seen him driving
(T-8 64).
Even though James Meacham was the bailiff in Judge Dutsonfs
court room in First Circuit Court, he did not inform Judge Dutson
that he had just served the defendant the summons in this matter
even though the defendant was present in court and appearing before
Judge Dutson on another matter (T-3 7).
There is no notation on the information as required by Rule
5(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (made applicable to criminal
procedure by Rule 81(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) so it is
apparent that Judge Judkins did not permit the filing of the
information with him (R. 186) . The information was not in fact
filed with the clerk of the court until June 6, 1991 at 11:08 a.m.
or two days after the date the defendant was supposed to appear
and answer to the Information (R. 186) .
On January 31, 1992 the defendant was arrested on another
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matter and for the first time learned that an Information had been
filed on June 6, 1991 or two days after he was supposed to appear
(R. 172-3).
Even though the defendant was indigent he was ordered to plead
without being furnished counsel and counsel was not appointed until
February 4, 1992 (R. 171).
On February 7, 1992 the court appointed counsel moved to dismiss
under the United States and Utah Constitutions for failure to grant
a speedy trial and because of denial of equal protection and due
process (R. 147 ). At the hearing on this motion James Meacham
testified the alleged driving took place on Thursday (which would
be May 16, 1991) and the state moved to amend the information. (T-.3 12)
The court did not rule on the state's motion, but took it under
advisement and denied the defendant's motions on April 3, 1992.
(Tr3 28)
Through discovery the defendant learned that most of the alleged
driving took place in River Heights, Utah and on March 31, 1992 the
defendant moved to dismiss because the Circuit Court did not have
jurisdiction over a Class C Misdemeanor traffic offense (R.115-118).
This motion was denied by the trial court on April 24, 1992 (TT24 9)
A jury trial was set for May 8, 1992.

The Clerk did not draw

the names of the prospective jurors by lot as required by Rule 18(a)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, but the 15 jurors summoned
were seated in aphabetical order (T-8 2, R. 36).
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During the examination of the 15 jurors defendant's counsel asked
the jurors if they would give the defendant the presumption of innocence
(T-8

27-8).

Many jurors indicated they would not so the Court explain-

ed the rule regarding presumption of innocence and defendant's counsel
asked the panel if the defendant does not take the witness stand fldo
any of you feel . . if . . a juror was in your present frame of mind
you would want that person to sit on a jury" (T-8 33). Only juror
Linda Price answered in the affirmative (T-8 34) and she was removed by
the State's second peremptory (R 36).

Defendant's motion to discharge

the entire panel was not recorded so it was renewed to clarify the record (T-8 34, 98). The court denied

the motion off the record.

Counsel for the defendant did not accept the jury but the Court
ordered counsel to select the jury by exercising their peremptory
challenges from the panel as seated in alphabetical order and not
as drawn by lot (T-8 2) (R 36).
During the trial even though the Court had previously ruled there
could be no evidence presented of driving in River Heights (T-24 5,
8-11) counsel for the plaintiff elicited

this information from the

only witness by asking the officer how far he had followed the defendant after he first observed him at Third South and Main and he answered
"mile and a half to two miles" which placed the defendant in River
Heights for most of the driving (T-8 56).
State introduced Exhibit "1" (R 76) the driving record of one
Don W. Dunbar, but no evidence was presented that this was the same
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Don W. Dunbar as was being tried (T-8 80, 81).
Exhibit "l11 also showed that this Don W. Dunbar's license had
expired on December 18, 1989 (one and one half years before being
charged with driving on suspension).

The defendant moved to dismiss

on the grounds that the proper offense was driving without a license
under Section 41-2-104 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, since the
license had expired and could no longer be suspended and for the
Statefs failure to show that the defendant had been given notice of
suspension.

(Both motions were denied.) (T-8 75-81.)

The defendant also requested an instruction that the jury could
find the defendant guilty of driving without a license, a lesser
offense of an infraction, but this was also denied.

(T-8 91-93.)

During the trial the prosecuting attorney informed the Court
that in the presence of a juror (Don Corbridge) who later became
the foreman he had discussed the case with the only witness, James
Meacham, in the court house lobby.

The Court quizzed the juror,

but all the juror could remember is that ffI remember hearing Mr.
Perry's name" but he could not recall anything else.

The defendant

moved for a mistrial which was denied (T-8 81-85).
This overheard conversation takes on additional significance
because of the affidavit attached to the motion for a certificate
of probable cause as it appears the juror had an adverse interest to
the defendant's attorney and may not have been unbiased (R 8-9).
The defendant did not testify (T-8 93).
The jury found the defendant guilty of driving on suspension
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and the defendant was sentenced to pay a fine of $150 and serve 30
days in the Cache County Jail with the days in jail suspended upon
payment of the fine.

(R. 21)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

A speedy trial is said to be a trial conducted according to
fixed rules, regulations, and proceedings of law, free from
vexatious, capricious,

and oppressive delays.

The failure of the

State of Utah to file the Information before issuing a summons, the
failure to arraign the defendant on the information when he was
present in court or to notify him of a date certain in which he
was to appear and thus allowing almost eight months to elapse
before the defendant knew he would need an alibi defense to defend
himself all compel the conclusion that under the eight factors
listed by the appellate courts the defendant was denied a speedy
trial.
Equal protection and due process demand that the defendant be
treated the same as all persons charged with an offense.

The failure

to issue a citation to the defendant when the officer claims to have
observed him driving or in the alternative to place him under arrest,
and the failure to file an information before issuing a summons, and
the failure to permit him to be arraigned on an information sworn
to but purposely not filed until after the defendant had left the
court on another matter all tend to show the defendant was not treated
the same as other persons charged with traffic misdemeanors.
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Sections 77-7-19(4)(b) and 78-4-5 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as
amended, in effect in May 1991 require the offense to be filed
in the justice court having jurisdiction where one was in existence
at the time of offense and the offense occurred within its
jurisdiction. Section 78-4-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended,
in effect when the defendant made his first appearance in January
1992 divests the Circuit Court of jurisdiction where the case was
not properly filed in May or June 1991.
Rule 18(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
requires the jurors to be drawn by lot and not arranged in alphabetical order as was done by the trial court.
The defendant is entitled to be tried by an impartial jury
and where alL the jurors but one refused to give him the presumption
of innocence and felt in their own minds they would not like a juror
in their frame of mind to try them if they were the defendant and
especially where it subsequently appeared that one juror could have
possibly been prejudiced against the defendant's attorney, the entire
panel should have been discharged and a new panel selected.
Under its authority in Rule 611 (a) of the Rules of Evidence
the Court should enforce its orders made in pre-trial conference by
declaring a mistrial when the prosecution violates the rule, especially
where the defendant has given a notice of alibi and allowing the
additional evidence may have interferred with the election to
testify.
As written the laws of the State of Utah should not be inter-
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preted as continuing the period of suspension after a driver's
license has expired by its terms.
Where the facts before the Court can be interpreted by the
jury in one of two ways, either that the defendant's license has
been suspended or that it has expired, the defendant is entitled to
an instruction setting forth his theory of the offense which would
be an infraction instead of a misdemeanor.
Since it is not possible to read a juror's mind, where he has
been exposed to a conversation between the prosecuting attorney and
the only witness in the case in which the case was discussed, there
should be a mistrial to assure that the defendant receives a fair trial
especially where it subsequently is shown that the juror exposed to
the conversation may have been prejudiced.
The defendant had to have knowledge that his license had been
suspended before

he should be found guilty of violating the law

prohibiting driving while his license is suspended.
While there is no rule against allowing a court bailiff to
testify, the close relationship between a bailiff and a judge should
compel the judge to employ another bailiff where the bailiff is
the only

witness in order to maintain the appearance of fairness.

Even though it is true that the rules allow an information to
be amended at almost anytime during the trial, where the state of
Utah has made a motion to amend, the Court should rule upon the
same prior to the beginning of the trial especially where the defendant
has given a notice that he intends to present evidence of an alibi
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as the date of the offense became critical to the case under such
circumstances.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF A SPEEDY TRIAL.
The Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
have stated that the right to a speedy trial is fact sensitive
(see State v. Weddle, 29 Utah 2d 145, 506 P. 2d 67 [1973], Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed 2d 101 [1972]
and see also State v. Hoyt, 806 P. 2d 204 [Utah App. 1991]).
In those cases eight factors are listed to be considered by the
Court in determining whether or not the defendant has been denied
his right to a speedy trial:

(1) which party caused it; (2) whether

it may have been willful and/or for some improper purpose; (3)
whether the defendant was aware of his rights; (4) whether he made
known his desire for a speedy trial; (5) whether by words or conduct
there was explicit or implicit waiver; (6) whether the proceeding
was completed as soon as reasonably could be done in the circumstances; (7) the length of delay; and (8) any prejudice to the defendant.
1.

Which party caused the delay.

The record is clear that

the State of Utah caused the delay in this matter.

Officer Meacham

claims to have seen the defendant driving a motorcycle on May 16
or May 17, 1991 at a time when he suspected his driver's license
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had been suspended (T.-3 4).
did he arrest him (T.-3

He did not give him a citation nor

5 ). The defendant was scheduled to be

in Circuit Court on another matter on June 3, 1991 at 4 p.m. (T-8 65)
Just prior to 4 p.m. on June 3, 1991 Officer Meacham went before
Judge Judkins (another Judge in the Circuit Court) and swore to
the information in this case (R. 186).

The information was not

filed at that time but was held for three days and then filed
at 11:08 a.m. on June 6, 1991 (R. 186). Nevertheless, Officer
Meacham obtained a summons and served it or had it served on the
defendant just prior to the hearing at 4 p.m. on June 3, 1991 (T^3 6,7).
Officer Meacham did not tell the Circuit Judge who was handling
the defendant's case on June 3, 1991 at 4 p.m. that he had just
signed an information even though he was the bailiff in that case
(T-3 7).

(See also T-8 65-66.)

The defendant was not asked to plead to the new information
on June 3, 1991 when he was in court, nor was there an information
on file on June 4, 1991, which was the first Tuesday after being
served with a summons,

to which he could have plead.

The State

of Utah further compounded the problem by not showing the
address of the defendant on the return of service of summons
as required by Utah Rules of C ivil Procedure, Rule 4(h)(1) made
applicable to the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by Rule 81(e)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Clerk was thus left

without any information as to the correct address of the defendant
to which notice could have been given after the information was
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filed and the four random addresses chosen were not successful.
Even though officer Meacham testified he had seen the defendant a
number of times in Logan (Tr8 51), no effort was made to bring the
defendant before the Court until he was arrested on another matter
and brought before the Court on January 31, 1992 (R. 172).
2.

Was the delay willful or for some improper purpose.

It

is, of course, impossible to read the mind of law enforcement officers,
but it is respectfully submitted it does seem strange that even though
officer Meacham claims to have seen the defendant on May 16 or 17,
1991 he did not issue him a citation nor place him under arrest.
He does not file an information until he finds the defendant is
appearing on another case where he is the bailiff, but then even
after swearing to the information just prior to the hearing at
4 p.m. on June 3, 1991 he does not file it until three days pass
(R. 186 ) , he obtains a summons without filing the information or
providing the judge with a probable cause statement as required by
Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, he serves or
has the summons served just prior to the hearing but does not tell
the judge that he has just sworn to an information, he does not obtain
the current address of the defendant when the summons is served so
that the clerk of the court can send a notice to the correct address,
and then even though he testifies he sees the defendant around Logan
from time to time (TT8 51)he makes no effort to have the defendant
served with a warrant of arrest until the defendant appears on
another matter.

All this time he knows that if the defendant appeared
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on the first Tuesday after service of the summons, which would have
been June 4, 1991, there would be no information on file because it
was not filed with the clerk of the court until June 6, 1991 at 11:08
a.m.

Certainly the facts indicate the delay was either willful or

for some improper purpose.
3.

Whether the defendant was aware of his rights.

There is

nothing in the record that indicates the defendant was ever advised
of his right to a speedy trial until his court appointed attorney
filed a motion in the trial court on February 7, 1992 or nearly nine
months after the officer claims to have seen the defendant driving
on May 16 or 17, 1991.
4.
trial.

Whether the defendant made known his desire for a speedy
Since the defendant was not arraigned on June 3, 1991 when

the officer should have brought the new information to the Court's
attention and since there was no information on file on June 4, 1991
when the defendant was supposed to appear it was impossible for the
defendant to ever make a demand for a speedy trial until his counsel
was appointed in February 1992.
5.

Whether the defendant used words or conduct to indicate

he waived the right to a speedy trial.

Except for the admission by

the defendant's attorney that the defendant did not voluntarily
appear on another matter there is nothing in the record that the
defendant used words or conduct to indicate a waiver of a speedy
trial until the defendant filed his motion to dismiss at which time
he waived the right to a speedy trial until the court determined
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the motion filed on February 7, 1992.
6.

Whether the proceedings were completed as soon as reasonably

could be done in the circumstances.

It is obvious that if the officer

had issued a citation or placed the defendant under arrest when he
claimed to have seen him driving on May 16 or 17, 1991 the proceedings
could have been completed in a short time.

It is obvious that if

the officer after swearing to an information on June 3, 1991 just
prior to the defendant's appearance in Court on another matter had
brought the information to the Courtfs attention the proceedings could
have been completed in a short time.

It is obvious that if the

information had been filed before the summons was issued as required
by law (see Rule 6(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure), if the
defendant had failed to appear on June 4, 1991 as required by the
summons a warrant could have been issued and matter completed in a
short time.

It is obvious that if the officer had placed the

defendant's current address on the return of the service of summons
(as required by Rule 4(h)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) the
proceedings could have been completed in a short time.

But the

failure of the officer to follow the required procedures caused a
delay of nearly nine months before the defendant even knew of his
right to a speedy trial.
7.

The length of the delay.

While it is true that in State

v. Trafny, 799 P 2d 704 (Utah 1990) the Utah Supreme Court allows
delays of from 3% months to 12 months, all of these delays were
contributed to by

the defendant.

The defendant cannot be charged
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with any delay in this case.
8.
offense.

Any prejudice to the defendant.

This is not a serious

The officer was confused at the hearing on April 3, 1992

as to whether the defendant had been driving on May 16 or May 17,
1991 (TT3 4-5). The defendant filed a notice of alibi thinking
that the offense took place on May 16, 1991 as the state had moved
to amend the information (Tr3

p.12), but because the defendant

had no memory of what had happened on May 17, 1991 (nearly a year
later) he was reluctant to take the witness stand.

Our whole judicial

system is built on fairness. Where the officer with his notes in
front of him cannot remember nearly a year later when the alleged
driving took place (Tr3

5), we should not expect the defendant to

remember what he was doing at that time.

Certainly the defendant

has been prejudiced in his defense by the action of the state in
keeping this case hid for nearly nine months before the defendant
is required to plead.
All of the essential elements which the Courts have used to
evaluate whether or not the defendant has been denied the right to
a speedy trial being in the defendant's favor, it is respectfully
submitted that the trial court should have granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the information for failure to provide the
defendant with a speedy trial under Article I, Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution and Amendment VI of the United States Constitution.
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POINT TWO:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS.
The law is well settled that a State may not treat its citizens
differently when bringing a criminal action.

Amendment XIV of the

United States Constitution and Section 24, Article I, of the Utah
Constitution requires that all persons similarly situated must be
treated alike.

To single out the defendant as the only person who

is charged with a violation of the driverfs license provisions where
the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant
did not have a valid driver's license (T-3 4); he

claims to have

seen the defendant driving on the highways of this state (T-3 4, 5)
but did not as required by law either stop him and issue a citation
to him or arrest him and take him before a magistrate (T-3 5 ) ,
but some two and one-half weeks later swear to an information
before a magistrate (R. 186) , obtain a summons from the magistrate
(without first filing the information as required by Rule 6[a]
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure), cause it to be served on a
Monday where the Summons required the defendant to appear on the
First Tuesday after Service and then fail to file the Information
with the clerk of the court until two days after the defendant
was supposed to appear (R. 186), after serving the summons fail to
inform the court before whom the defendant was appearing and where
the same officer was the bailiff (R. 183) fail to inform the court
that he had just sworn to an information (T^3 7 ) , and where the
officer serving the summons failed to note the place where the
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defendant was served is to treat the defendant differently than
all other persons are treated in similar situations in the State of
Utah.
In Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U. S. 584, 2 L ed 2d 991, 78
S. Ct. 970, the United States Supreme Court said:

"But no State is

at liberty to impose upon one charged with crime a discrimination
in its trial procedure which the Constitution, and an Act of Congress
passed pursuant to the Constitution, alike forbid.

Nor is this Court

to grant or withhold the benefits of equal protection, which the
Constitution commands for all, merely as we may deem the defendant
innocent or guilty."
Section 41-6-167, Utah Code Ann. 1953 is clear.

It provides

that "Upon any violation of this act (the Motor Vehicle Act under
which the defendant is charged) punishable as a misdemeanor (the
defendant was charged with a Class C Misdemeanor), whenever a person
is (the word "not" should be inserted in the Code as it was inadvertantly omitted when the law was changed from the 1943 compilation of
the Utah Code and Section 57-7-227, Utah Code Ann. 1943 includes the
word "not" at this point) immediately taken before a magistrate as
hereinbefore provided, the police officer shall prepare in triplicate
or more copies a written notice to appear in court containing the
name and address of such person . ." Upon claiming to have seen
the defendant driving without a license on May 16 or May 17, 1991,
the officer did not issue him a citation nor did he take him before
a magistrate (T-3 5, 6).
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Section 41-6-169 Utah Code Ann. 1953 allows an alternative
procedure where the officer does not arrest the alleged offender or
issue him a citation as provided in Section 41-6-167, supra. In this
section of the code the legislature has authorized the arrest
and prosecution in any other way provided by law.

The legislature

did not authorize the State of Utah to proceed by summons where
the officer failed to comply with Section 41-6-167, supra. Had
the officer asked the magistrate for a warrant of arrest he would
have had to make an affidavit showing there is probable cause for
the arrest (see Giordenello v. United States of America, 357 U. S.
480, 2 L ed 2d 1503, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958) holding that mere recital
of facts on a complaint is not sufficient for issuance of a warrant,
but a neutral magistrate must determine probable cause).
Indeed Rule 6(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly requires the magistrate to determine there is probable
cause before issuing either a warrant or a summons.

In this case

all the magistrate had before him was a conclusion of law sworn to
on information and belief by the officer which did not allege any
facts that the officer had personally witnessed the defendant driving
or that the officer had knowledge from a particular source that the
defendant's driver's license had been suspended.

(See 5 Am Jur 2d

Arrest Section 13 p. 706 and Section 14 p. 707 expressly stating that
ff

an affidavit that merely states belief in the guilt of the accused

is insufficient to support a warrant of arrest . If)
It is clear that the State of Utah failed to follow its own
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procedures where the officer did not either issue the defendant
a citation, or make an arrest without a warrant, or make an affidavit
which established probable cause for issuance of a warrant or summons.
Had the officer issued a citation or arrested the defendant
when he claimed to have observed him on May 16 or 17, 1991 there
would have been no question as to the date of the offense and
probably no question as to whether or not the defendant was driving.
Had the officer made an affidavit setting forth facts which justified
the issuance of a warrant of arrest at the time he erroneously
requested a summons, there would have been no doubt as to the date
of the alleged offense and the affidavit would have been on file
with the information for the defendant to examine at the time he
was served with summons on June 3, 1991 and perhaps he could have
remembered at that time where he was on May 16 or May 17, 1991-

But

permitting the State of Utah to disregard its procedures as was done
in this case seriously interferes with the defendant's ability to
defend himself and may result in an innocent person being punished
for a crime which our system is intended to prevent.
The Information should have been dismissed for failure to
give the defendant equal protection of the laws.
The procedure in this case disregarded the law in so many
respects that the information should have been dismissed as the
defendant was denied due process of law.

(See Chambers v. Mississippi,

410 U S 284, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L ed 2d 297 (1973) where the Court said:
"The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in
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essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the
Statef s accusations."
POINT THREE:

WHERE A TRAFFIC OFFENSE OCCURS PARTLY IN A JURISDICTION

THAT HAS A JUSTICE COURT AND IT IS A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR, A CIRCUIT
COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION.
It is clear that Section 78-4-5 Utah Code Ann. 1953 in effect
on January 1, 1992 gives Circuit Courts jurisdiction over Class C
Traffic Offenses only where the case was properly filed prior to
January 1, 1992. The facts in this case show the case was not properly filed prior to January 1, 1992.
It is clear that officer Meacham testified that he observed
the defendant driving a few blocks in Logan (T-%3, 8) and then about
a mile and a half in River Heights (T-*8 56) .
The laws of the State of Utah are silent with respect to a
traffic offense over which a justice court has jurisdiction where it
occurs partly in the geograpical boundaries of a muncipality where
a justice court exists and partly within the geographical boundaries
of a municipality where no justice court exists, but Sections 78-4-5
Utah Code Ann. in effect on June 3, 1991 when the information was
signed and Section 77-7-19(4)(b) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, are
clear that if the offense occurs within the geographical boundaries
of a municipality where a justice court exists that justice court
is the magistrate before whom the person should appear.
Since the legislature has chosen not to make any exception to
that rule, different interpretation would permit judge shopping
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frowned upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Wells v. Logan City Court,
535 P. 2d 683 (1975), Hillyard v. Logan City Court, 578 P 2d. 1270
(1978), and Woytko v. Browning, 659 P 2d 1058 (1983).

But in Mr.

Dunbar!s case now before this court the problem is clearly one of
jurisdiction and not one of venue and the legislature has chosen to
give the municipal justice courts jurisdiction without exception
if the offense occurs within their geographical limits.
It is also clear that the information in this case can hardly
be said to have been properly filed where a summons may not be issued
before it is filed (see Rule 6(a) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure)
but a summons was issued and the information was not filed until
three days after the issuance of the summons, the information was
not filed with the circuit court judge as permitted by Rule 5(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor was the information filed
without delay contrary to the intent of Rule 7(2) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Since the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction the matter
should be remanded for a new trial in the River Heights Municipal
Justice Court.
POINT FOUR:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT REQUIRING THE CLERK TO

DRAW THE JURY PANEL BY LOT INSTEAD OF SEATING THE PANEL IN
ALPHABETICAL ORDER.
Contrary to the express provisions of Rule 18(a) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires that the clerk of the
court "draw by lot11 the number of the jurors to try the cause plus
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such additional number as will allow for all peremptory challenges
permitted, the Court ordered all fifteen prospective jurors to be
seated in alphabetical order (only ten names should have been drawn
as only four jurors are required for Class C Misdemeanors [Section
78-46-5(3) Utah Code Ann. 1953] and each side is allowed three
peremptory challenges [Rule 18(d) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure].)
After each side had asked the jurors questions the jurors were
allowed to remain seated in alphabetical order and the parties had
to exercise their peremptory challenges based on the selection by
alphabetical order instead of having the jurors drawn by lot (T-8 2).
Clearly such a disregard for the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure should not be allowed to go unchallenged and the matter
should be remanded for a new trial with the jury selected in a
proper manner.

POINT FIVE:

(See State v. Bates, 22 Utah 65, 61 Pac. 905 [1900].)

WHERE THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WERE NOT WILLING TO GIVE

THE DEFENDANT THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IF HE CHOSE NOT TO TESTIFY
THE ENTIRE PANEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCHARGED.
Rule 18 (e) (14) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides in part that a juror is disqualified if "a state of mind
exists on the part of the juror . . which will prevent him from acting
impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party . ." During voir dire counsel for the defendant asked the
following:
I can't read your minds, just like the prosecutor, but I'd
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like to know, knowing what the Court's instructed you about
the law about . . the defendant having the presumption of
innocence, the State having to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and he doesnft have to take the witness
stand unless we decided we want to put him on the witness
stand; do any of you feel that if you were the defendant
sitting here, and a juror was in your present frame of mind,
you would want that person to sit on a jury?
If you think that you have that frame of mind that you'd be
willing to be in the position of the defendant under these
conditions, would you please raise your hand?
The record showed that Mrs. Price was the only juror to raise her
hand (T-8 34).
The defendant's challenge to the entire panel at this point
is not recorded, but to avoid the possibility it was not the
defendant made it matter of record that he did not accept the jury
(T-8 34, 98).
If all the jurors that sat on this case would not want a
juror in their present frame of mind to sit in judgment if they
were the defendant, surely the Court of Appeals should find as
a matter of law that the jury were not impartial as required by
Rule 18 (e) (14) supra.
POINT NO. SIX:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT DECLARING A MISTRIAL

WHEN THE PROSECUTION INTRODUCED EVIDENCE THAT PART OF THE ALLEGED
DRIVING TOOK PLACE IN RIVER HEIGHTS WHERE THE COURT HAD PREVIOUSLY
INSTRUCTED THE PROSECUTION THAT SUCH EVIDENCE WOULD NOT BE ADMITTED.
Defendants motion for lack of jurisdiction was denied because
the trial court felt if no evidence was presented that the defendant
ever drove in River Heights there would be no question as to jurisdiction. (T-24 5, 8-11).

Nevertheless the plaintiff asked the witness
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how far he followed the defendant knowing the answer would place
the defendant in River Heights (T-8 56, T-3 7-8). This problem
arises because after the testimony the defendant renewed his objection
as to lack of jurisdiction because the driving took place in River
Heights which has a municipal justice court (T-8 84). Since
the Court had previously denied that motion solely upon the basis
that the State of Utah would not introduce any evidence of driving
in River Heights, the Court should have declared a mistrial or
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
(T-24 5, 5-11).
POINT NO. SEVEN:

(See also T-8 47.)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING THE MOTION

FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THE DEFENDANT'S
LICENSE HAD EXPIRED ONE AND ONE HALF YEARS BEFORE THE ALLEGED CHARGE
OF DRIVING ON SUSPENSION.
Even though there was no evidence that the driving records
introduced as Exhibit 1 were the driving records of the defendant
Don W. Dunbar, if we assume that they were his driving records they
clearly show that his driver's license expired on December 18, 1989.
Accordingly the defendant moved for a directed verdict because
the evidence showed his driverfs license had expired, it was therefore
no longer suspended.

(T-8 75-78)

Section 41-2-102 (25) Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended in effect
on May 17, 1991 defines "Suspension11.

It means "the temporary

withdrawal by action of a division of a licensee's privilege to
operate a motor vehicle."

The legislature did not provide that the
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term "suspension" included "expiration11 which means "termination
from lapse of time" (Black1s Law Dictionary, 1979, West Publishing
Co. p. 519). Some indication that the legislature did not intend
to include "expiration" as part of the term, "suspension" is found
in Section 41-12a-412 Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended.

In sub-paragraph

(3) of that Section the legislature provides that a suspended license
"may not be renewed, nor may any driver's license thereafter be issued"
until proof of security is maintained.

So the legislature recognized

that after the license had expired it was no longer suspended, but even
so no new license could be issued until proof of security was maintained.
In sub-paragraph (5) the legislature provides that a nonresident's
operating privilege "remains suspended or revoked" until proof of
security is presented.

If the legislature had meant the same provision

to apply to a resident it could have said so, but the legislature
recognized a non-resident could obtain a new license in another state,
and so it specifically extended the period of suspension of the
original driverfs license where a non-resident is involved.
The defendant was charged with a violation of Section 41-2136 Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended because his license was suspended
and he drove.

Since his license had expired he is not guilty of

violating this section but only Section 41-2-104 Utah Code Ann. 1953
as amended as he did not have a license.
is only an

A violation of this section

infraction (see 41-6-12(2) Utah Code Ann. 1953).

POINT NO. EIGHT:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT PERMITTING THE JURY

TO CONSIDER A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF DRIVING WITHOUT A LICENSE.
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For the reasons discussed under Point No. Seven the defendant
requested an instruction that the jury may find the defendant guilty
of driving without a license (T-8 91-93)*which the Court denied. It
is respectfully submitted that where the evidence before the Court
showed that the defendantfs license had expired prior to the time
it was suspended, the jury as a fact finder (Section 77-17-10 Utah
Code Ann. 1953 as amended) should have been entitled to consider
whether or not the defendant was guilty of a lesser offense of
driving without a license, an infraction.
POINT NO. NINE:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A MISTRIAL

WHERE THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY AND THE STATE'S ONLY WITNESS DISCUSSED
THE CASE IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY FOREMAN.
During the trial a juror, Don

Corbridge, admitted overhearing

a conversation between the prosecutor and the state's only witness
(T-8 82). He recognized the prosecutor and Mr. Meachan and heard
ff

Mr. Perry's name" (T-8 82). After the time had expired for filing

a motion for new trial it was learned that this same juror was the
son of Mrs. Casper Merrill who was sueing her husband for a divorce
and there was a considerable property settlement involved and Mr.
Casper Merrill was represented by the firm to which the defendant's
attorney belonged (R. 8-9).
The defendant moved for a mistrial because "improper contacts
may influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to
recognize" (State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 P. 941, 943 (1925)
and see Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P2d 224 [Utah App. 1990]) (T-8 84).
*(R 58)
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Even though the prosecutor had the burden of showing that the juror
was not influenced the Court assumed the prosecutor's role and
examined the juror (see State v. Pike, 712 P 2d 277 [Utah 1985]).
Had the appropriate question of asking the juror if because Mr.
Perry was involved in this case he had some reservations about his
impartiality been asked it may have shown that in fact this juror
was biased.

In any event because of the concern raised in Point

No. Five it would appear even this incidental contact with the
prosecutor and the statefs witness may have prevented the defendant
from receiving a fair trial.
POINT NO. TEN:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT GRANTING A MOTION FOR

A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SHOW THE DEFENDANT WAS
GIVEN NOTICE OF SUSPENSION OR THAT HE WAS THE SAME PERSON NAMED
IN THE DRIVING RECORDS.
By stipulation the certified driving record of one Don W.
Dunbar was received into evidence (T-8 58, 59). There was no
stipulation that the Don W. Dunbar named in the driving record
was the same Don W. Dunbar that Officer Meacham claimed to have
seen driving on May 16, or May 17, 1991. There was no evidence
that Mr. Dunbar ever received notice of any suspension or that he
had ever lived at the address indicated on the driving records.
Exhibit 1 did show that the notice mailed to the address on the
driving record of the Dunbar named in the records was not delivered.
Mr. Dunbar was faced with a difficult decision in this case. He
could remember where he was on May 16, 1991 and when the State of
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Utah moved to amend the information (T-3 12) he filed a notice to
claim an alibi defense (T-24 11). But since he was not prepared
to provide an alibi defense for May 17, 1991 at the time of trial
it seemed the best course was to not testify since the State of
Utah had failed to show that he was in fact the same Don W. Dunbar
as was named of the certified copy of the driving record.
The defendant moved for a directed verdict as there was no
evidence that the Don W. Dunbar named in the driving record was
the same Don W. Dunbar who appeared as the defendant (T-8 80).
The Court did not find there was any such evidence but simply
deferred the matter for the jury to consider (T-8 81).*
Under Section 76-2-101 Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended MNo
person is guilty of an offense

unless his conduct is prohibited by

law and: (1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with
criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in
the statute . " and this applies to offenses under Title 41 except
for those offenses in Chapter 6.

If there is no evidence before the

Court that Don W. Dunbar the defendant was the same person as is
named on the certified copy of the driving records then it seems it
is impossible to find that he could act intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly or with criminal negligence even though the jury may have
believed he was driving on May 17, 1991. The Court of Appeals has
insisted that a culpable mental state be found by the jury (see
State v. Warden, 784 P 2d 1204 [Utah App. 1989] reversed State v.
Warden, 813 P. 2d 1146 [Utah 1991]).
* See Appendix
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It is respectfully submitted

that in absence of any evidence that the two Don W. Dunbar's are the
same the Court should have granted a directed verdict (see State v.
Strieby, 790 P. 2d 98 [Utah App. 1990] at p. 101 " . every element of
the crime charged must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt" and 75A
Am Jur 2d §910-912 Trial, p. 489-490).
POINT NO. ELEVEN:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT SUA SPONTE REQUIRING

ANOTHER BAILIFF TO ATTEND THE PROCEEDINGS ON APRIL 3, 1992 AND APRIL
24, 1992 WHERE THE INFORMATION SHOWED THE BAILIFF WAS THE ONLY WITNESS
FOR THE STATE IN THIS CASE.
Admittedly this issue was properly raised by the State of Utah
and counsel for the defendant did not object (T-3 2). Howver the defendant Mr. Dunbar did object and as a result of the many unusual events
that occurred in this entire procedure in connection with this defendant
it appears that his objection may have been well taken.
The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct requires the judge to avoid
the appearance of impropriety in all activities and that he should
perform his duties impartially.

While to the lawyer who appears

before the Court day after day there seldom arises a question of
concern about judicial impropriety or impartiality (see Canon 2 and
3 Utah Code of Judicial Conduct), an accused person may see things
differently.

That is the reason for avoiding the appearance of

impropriety in all actions.
Here James Meacham was the bailiff on June 3, 1991 when the
Honorable Roger Dutson sat in the First Circuit Court and the defendant Don W. Dunbar appeared in another matter (T-8 65, T-3 7).
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Mr. Dunbar was served with a summons that said an information
had been filed, but he was not asked to plead to the information
even though he was present in Court.

Nearly a year later on April

3, 1992 he comes into court believing that there is something wrong
with a procedure that would hide an information for a long time
(in fact not even file it until after he had appeared in court
even though the summons said it had been filed) and the first person
he sees is that same bailiff that served him with a summons but
failed to file the information as required by law nearly a year
before.

Under such circumstances one can excuse the defendant for

telling his attorney to object because the state's only witness in
this case was the bailiff who seems to have access to the judge
presiding as both enter together and leave together (T-3 3).

POINT NO. TWELVE:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT RULING UPON THE

STATE'S MOTION TO AMEND THE INFORMATION MADE ON APRIL 3, 1992 TO
CHANGE THE DATE OF THE OFFENSE TO MAY 16, 1991 AS WITH THE MOTION
PENDING THE DEFENDANT COULD NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE OF AN ALIBI NOR
COULD THE DEFENDANT EXERCISE HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN BEHALF
WITHOUT KNOWING WITH CERTAINTY THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE.
At the hearing on April 3, 1992 the State of Utah moved to
amend the information to state the date of the offense as May 16,
1991 (T-3 12, 21). At that hearing nor in later discovery did the
State of Utah ever indicate to the defendant that it would withdraw
its motion and stay with the May 17, 1991 date.

Thereafter the

defendant did some research and filed a notice of alibi for May 16
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1991.

The defendant was prepared to testify as to his doings on

May 16, 1991, but felt that without further research he could not
take the witness stand and testify as to May 17, 1991. His dilemma
has been discussed under point no. ten. (See also T-8 68.)
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution requires the
State of Utah to inform the defendant of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.

Rules 4 and 16 of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure indicate that the defendant is entitled to know
the date of the offense where it is necessary to avoid the defendant
being punished twice for the same offense.

Rule 1 of the Utah Rules

of Criminal Procedure requires "fairness in administration."

It is

respectfully submitted that where the State of Utah furnishes discovery
that raises some question about the date of the offense, where the
officer upon reviewing his notes decides that the offense occurred
on May 16, 1991 but then later changes his mind but never notifies
the defendant until he testifies at the time of trial, there is no
compliance with the requirements of the Utah Constitution nor is
there any fairness in the administration of justice to this defendant.
In McNair v. Hayward, 666 P. 2d 321 (Utah 1983) the Utah
Supreme Court said " . time is always an essential element of a crime
in the sense that due process requires than accused be given
sufficiently precise notification of the date of the alleged crime
that he can prepare his defense."

How can it be said the defendant

could prepare his defense when the State had a motion to amend the
information to change the date to May 16, 1991 (T-3 12) before the
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trial court which the court had taken under advisement and the first
indication the defendant had that the State would not proceed with
its motion was when officer Meacham took the witness stand.
CONCLUSION

"While it is true that no precise definition of the phrase
1

due process of law1 can be given, the courts have frequently defined

the phrase in general terms.

It has been said that due process of law

must be understood to mean law in the regular course of administration
through courts of justice according to those rules and forms which
have been established for the protection of private rights."

(See

16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law §808, p. 960.)
The defendant came to the First Circuit Court of the State of
Utah expecting to be accorded due process of law.

A couple of matters

in this record and this appeal indicates that he did not feel he was
given "law in the regular course of administration through courts of
justice" (16A Am Jur 2d Constitutional Law, supra.)
At the first hearing in this matter he expressed his concern
that the only witness in the case was also the bailiff and seemingly
had access to the Court when the defendant was not present (T-3 4):
"Mr. Dunbar says there is a problem . ." with James Mecham serving
as bailiff.

At the conclusion of the trial he expressed concern

about the testimony of Mr. Meacham:

" . but part of it is the outrage

over the license being revoked or suspended due to an officerfs
perjury in the first place."

(T-8 134)*

*See in the Appendix Officer Meacham1s contradictory testimony that
he had and did not have the driving records on May 17, 1991.
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The defendant could reasonable conclude that he was not
getting the fair hearing to which he was entitled by the Court's
final comments to Mr. Dunbar:
. you've been a real pain in the ass to a lot of
people around here, you know that. You've done some
things that you know you shouldn't have done (T-8 p. 137)
If that statement was not enough to indicate to the defendant that
perhaps the system was working against him the Court went on to
say:
. . I feel sometimes like coming off the bench and hitting
you on the head with a two-by-four to get your attention,
but that wouldn't do any good. . (T-8 137).
The record in this case shows that the defendant's prior
driving record (if we can accept Exhibit 1 as being the defendant's
driving record), involved only a refusal to submit to a breath test
and a subsequent driving under the influence conviction.

It is

respectfully submitted that such a record hardly requires the
above comments of the Court unless the Court may have learned some
additional information through the bailiff that is not part of the
record.

Under the possibility of that this may be the reason for

the Court's comments, it is respectfully submitted that the Court
of Appeals should carefully consider the questions raised in this
appeal.
First there is the question of lack of a speedy trial solely
because the bailiff, the complaining officer, James Meacham,did not
follow the usual procedure in this case of stopping the defendant
when he suspected he was driving on suspension and issuing him a
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citation, but waiting nearly three weeks until he knew the defendant
would be in court on another matter and serving him with a summons
without filing the information or bringing it to the Court's
attention and then not filing it until two days after the defendant
was supposed to appear.

Surely

the Court of Appeals should not

condone such unfair action on part of an officer of this state and
as a bar to future officers who may want to cause an accused person
a serious inconvenience, the Court of Appeals should dismiss this
entire procedure as a violation of the defendant's rights to a speedy
trial under the Utah and the United States Constitutions.
Second, if the Court of Appeals does not want to establish
a precedent that errors of an officer should be grounds for denial
of a speedy trial in absence of some effort of the defendant to
exercise that right, then surely the unusual actions of Officer
Meacham in this case failing to issue a citation to the defendant
or even calling his attention to the fact the the officer had
observed him driving, and then waiting three weeks until the
defendant was in court on another matter and signing the information
but failing to have it brought to the defendant's attention while
he is in court and making sure that if he does appear the next
day on the summons as he is supposed to do, making sure that no
information is on file to which the defendant can enter a plea,
then filing the information after the date the defendant is supposed
to appear so that the Court can issue a bench warrant without a
probable cause statement from the officer that would help the
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defendant in preparing his defense warrants a finding that the
defendant has been denied equal protection and due process of the
law under the Utah and the United States Constitutions.
Third, if the Court of Appeal does not feel

the unusual action

of the officer is sufficient to discharge the defendant, then surely
this is the time to clarify the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts
and Municipal Justice Courts when a traffic offense, a Class C
Misdemeanor occurs partly within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court and partly within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Circuit Court.

It is respectfully submitted that the intent

of the legislature seems clear that it is intended that when such
occurs there should be no opportunity for judge shopping but all
Class C Misdemeanor traffic offenses should be filed in the Municipal
Justice Courts if they would have jurisdiction.
Fourth, it seems there is no question but that the lower court
should be informed that it is improper to seat the jury in alphabetical
order since the Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly require that the
names chosen for the jury panel should be drawn by lot so that the
Roe's have an equal chance to sit on a the jury as the Doe's.
Fifth, it is respectfully submitted that every defendant is
entitled to have a jury that is impartial sit in judgment and if
the jurors have some personal feelings that would make them think
they would not like a juror in their same frame of mind to sit on
their case, that juror should be excused.

In this case all the

prospective jurors except one felt they would not like a juror in the
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same frame of mind as they were to sit on the case if they were the
defendant.
Sixth, it is unfair to a defendant to come to court thinking
that no evidence will be presented that he drove in River Heights
and then have the State of Utah elicit that evidence from the witness
in violation of a direct court order.
Seventh, where the statutes regarding driver's licenses are
ambiguous to say the least and it is clear that if Exhibit 1 referred
to the driving record of the defendant he was entitled to a directed
verdict as the evidence showed his license had expired after it was
suspended.
Eighth, it was apparent from the record that if Exhibit 1 did
refer to the driving record of the defendant it showed that his
driver's license had expired, and he was therefore entitled to have
the jury determine the factual situation of whether he was driving
with an expired driver's license or one that was still in effect but
temporarily suspended, as he was entitled to have the lesser offense
submitted to the jury as an alternative verdict.
Ninth, a defendant is always concerned when a juror hears a
conversation regarding the case outside of the court room, and no
amount of testimony will ever convince the losing defendant that
something improper was not said.

This was especially significant

in this case as there may be some question as to the juror's
impartiality because of evidence which arose after the time had
expired for filing a motion for new trial.

-46-

The defendant should be

given a new trial to be sure that he received a verdict from a
jury in which all members were impartial and did not receive evidence
outside of the court room.
Tenth, the defendant realizes that he must martial all the
evidence which supports the jury's verdict where he asks for a reversal
by the Court of Appeal, but there is simply not one statement in the
entire record that the driving record of Don W. Dunbar named in
Exhibit 1 is the same Don W. Dunbar named as defendant in this case.
It is respectfully submitted that the Court of Appeals should not
allow prosecutor's to get sloppy and omit essential testimony even
where the case involves a small matter, a Class C Misdemeanor, as it
is at this stage the great majority of the citizens of this state get
their understanding of the importance of having a government of laws
and not a government of men who may assume facts not in evidence
because they assume common sense tells them they are doing the right
thing.

Allowing sloppy procedure will eventually result in the

innocent being convicted and that is most certainly contrary to the
laws and constitutions of this state and the United States of America.
Eleventh, the Court of Appeals should use this case to instruct
trial judges that the lay person in court may see things a little
differently and allowing a person to serve as bailiff with access
to the judge where the bailiff is the only witness does not present
an appearance of fairness regardless of whether or not any prejudice
resulted.
Twelfth, the trial court cannot use the procedure of taking
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motions under advisement where substantial rights of a defendant
are involved such as the right to know the precise date on which
the alleged offense occurred.

The defendant views this as a serious

breach of his right to a fair trial and he fully intends to find
an alibi witness for the May 17, 1991 date if the Court of Appeal
grants him a new trial as it should do where the actions of the
trial court seriously interfered with his opportunity to adequately
prepare for trial.
In view of the many errors, it is respectfully submitted that
the Utah Court of Appeals should reverse the decision of the trial
court and discharge the defendant or at the very least remand the
case for a trial using correct and fair procedures which will
assure the defendant of having a trial governed by the same rules
as are applied to all defendants and a fair opportunity to defend
himself.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JO

day of July, 1992.

^ji
Te/ S. Perry
/
Attorney for ^Defendant and
Appellant
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APPENDIX
Under the rule requiring the appellant to martial all the
evidence which sustains the verdict where the appellant claims the
trial court erred in not granting a motion for a directed verdict,
the following is presented as all the evidence in the record from
which the jury could find that the Don W. Dunbar named in Exhibit
1 was the same person as is named as the defendant in this action:
Under direct examination of James Meacham by the State the following
appears:
Q.

After you observed the defendant driving this motor vehicle, did
you then make a determination, through the State of Utah, as to
whether he possessed a valid driver's license in the State of
Utah?
MR. PERRY: Just a moment, your Honor. I think the evidence of
what the status of his license was will be contained in the
report, not what his personal observation is, and I think his
personal observation is hearsay.
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. Itfs my understanding
that there has been a stipulation that the certified driving
record can be received. (T-8 58)
Is that correct Counsel?
MR. PERRY:

That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. If that could be marked then and that
will be admitted as an exhibit. And I111 direct that the jury
may consider that as proven because there has been a stipulation;
in other words, the exhibit will be available for you and admitted
as evidence.
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Showing you what has been marked for identification as Plaintifffd Exhibit-MR. PRESTON: Well, at this time, I'd offer into evidence
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, Counsel.
MR. PERRY:

No objection, your Honor.
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THE COURT:

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is admitted.

Q. (By Mr. Preston) Show you what has been marked for identification
as Plaintiff1s Exhibit 1. Just for purposes of identification,
the — the top sheet on that is a certification by the records
officer, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the second page down is — i s a printout from a —
MR. PERRY: Well, your Honor, I donft know that the jury needs
an explanation of what the exhibit is. They can read. And I
think we donft need further comment by counsel or the witness
as to what is says.
(T-8 59)
THE COURT: The best--the best evidence, it would seem would be
the document itself. You may ask questions about whether or not
he has taken action on it or something, but I think the best
evidence would be the document itself.
Where are we going with this?
MR.PRESTON:

Let me ask—well, let me ask this question then.

Q. (By Mr. Preston) Did—have you seen a copy of that prior to this
time?
A. Yes.

I have.

Q. After you saw Don Dunbar driving, did you obtain a copy of that,
or other duplicate copies of that document?
A. Yes, sir.

I made the request for the—

MR. PERRY:

I think the question can be answered yes or no.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
Q. (By Mr. Preston) As a result of that, did you make a determination
as to whether or not he had in fact committed a criminal offense
in your presence?
A. Yes.
Q. And that offense was what?
MR. PERRY: Well, just a minute. I think the document speaks
for itself and now hefs invading the province of the jury.
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THE COURT Well-- (T-8 60)
MR. PRESTON: Well, I think—
THE COURT:
but —

--if you'll rephrase that question, I'll allow it,

Q. (By Mr. Preston) Let me put it this way: As a result of reading
that document, did you then sign an Information charging Don
Dunbar with driving during suspension?
A. Yes.- I did.

(T-8 61)

. . .

Q. (By Mr. Preston) Had you at that time--did you at that time,
have the documentation from the State of Utah evidencing the
fact that he was on suspension?
A. Yes.

I was already—

MR. PERRY:

Objection, your Honor.

I think-- (T-8 73)

THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection as to the characterization of the documents; however, you may rephrase the
question.
Q. (By Mr. Preston) Did you have any personal knowledge of whether
or not the defendant did or did not have a driver's license at
that time?
MR. PERRY: Well, just a moment, your Honor. He can ask the
question when he received the documents from the State of Utah.
The question the Court struck out is what it said, and that's
what I objected to. Now personal knowledge obviously doesn't-THE COURT: Sustain—sustain the objection.
the question.
Q. (By Mr. Preston)

You may rephrase

Exhibit—where is the exhibit?

A. Right here.
Q. Exhibit 1 is dated—Exhibit 1 is dated by the State of Utah,
on June 10th; is that correct?
A June 10th, 1991.
''Note Officer Meacham testifies he read Exhibit 1 on June 3 when he
signed the Information even though Exhibit 1 was not prepared until
June 10th.
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Q. So, therefore, that document was not in your possession at that
time? On the 17th of May?
A.

This certified copy was not, that is correct. (T-8 74)
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